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Sunday, December 11, 2011

U.S.-NATO ABM Missile System “Covers” a Large Part of Russian Territory

U.S.-NATO ABM Missile System “Covers” a Large Part of Russian Territory

Global Research

It is inadmissible for Russia NATO’s missile defence to cover the part of its territory, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said after a session of the Russia-NATO Council on Thursday.

At the same time, Lavrov said that a new radar, which would be deployed in Turkey within missile defence, would control the most part of the Russian territory.

“If this radar was necessary to monitor the south and an area to the south of the territory of NATO members, such radar exists – it functions and watches the area from where the threat comes from, according to American and NATO colleagues,” the minister noted.

He stressed, “When a radar is deployed in Turkey, it will double the existing radar and watch a considerable part of Russian territory.”

Turkey and the United States signed a memorandum on the deployment of a radar in Turkey within missile defence in September. The radar will be deployed in Kurecik, south-east of Turkey. Kurecik in Malatya province lies 435 miles west of the Iranian border.

In September, Pentagon spokesman Colonel Dave Lapan said the U.S. hoped to have the radar deployed there by the end of the year.

NATO members agreed to an anti-missile system over Europe…at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal last year…

Under the NATO plans, a limited system of US anti-missile interceptors and radars already planned for Europe – to include interceptors in Romania and Poland as well as the radar in Turkey – would be linked to an expanded European-owned missile defences. That would create a broad system that protected every NATO country against medium-range missile attack.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

INTEL: Global Military Space : MilsatMagazine

INTEL: Global Military Space : MilsatMagazine:

INTEL: Global Military Space
by Futron

One of the most widely appreciated analysis firms with a 20-year track record is Futron. The Company provides premier Decision Management Solutions and products to a variety of complex technology industries. Futron offers architectures and solutions that transform data into valuable intelligence for informed decisions, to substantially improve judgments in business, program, and project management and engineering. We thank Futron for allowing us to reprint one of the most critical segments of their recently published 2009 Space Competitiveness Index (SCI) — Global Military Space. Again, this is but one single index within their exhaustive report.

This year’s report greatly expands upon their landmark and inaugural 2008 study and examines, in greater depth, 10 nations currently leading in space and space-related activity: Brazil, Canada, China, Europe (considered as a single entity), India, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index evaluates these nations across 50 individual metrics that represent the underlying economic determinants of space competitiveness in three major dimensions: government, human capital, and industry.

Militaries and intelligence forces fully realize the value of space capability and consequently, invest significant resources in developing and utilizing space-based assets. The clearest validation of its importance is the sheer number of military or dual-use satellites — 232 out of a total 903 satellites at the end of 2008. Investment in military space also drives innovation, research and development of new space technology. As a case in point, the procurement by the U.S. military of so-called communications on the move (COTM) products and services has resulted in technological innovation that is now migrating into civilian and commercial applications. Protecting these technologies via export controls has evolved into a controversial tug-of-war between the need to project technological advantage and the need for continued R&D and the generation of product sales. Just as the debate of U.S. export controls heats up, Israel, a leading exporter of defense and space products, has introduced new export regime.

For many countries, spending on military space outpaces investment in civilian and commercial activities; in other segments such as launch, PNT and Earth observation, platforms are dual-use in nature. Since military space spending continues to constitute a significant portion of space investment, organizational resources, and governmental focus, the purpose of the Global Military Space Competitiveness Index is to understand and quantify the relative position of military activities of leading space powers.

Military programs and assets provide distinct force-multiplying capabilities to armed forces, and, consequently, military organizations worldwide have steadily increased reliance on space assets for communications, surveillance, and tracking. This increased usage can create asymmetric threats whereby a weaker power or near-peer could exploit the space dependence of its stronger adversary as a force equalizer.

Given the importance of military space, understanding the relative positioning of a country’s military space program — from strategy and doctrine to spending, technology, and assets — is a critcal component to understanding a country’s relative space competitiveness overall.

The interaction between the military space sector and its civilian and commercial counterparts is multifaceted and varies from country to country. In addition to its pure national security benefits, military space can also facilitate development of the commercial and civil space sectors both directly and indirectly.

Military space investment can also yield advantages in other areas of national space competitiveness, including advanced technology development and the creation of spin-off industries such as GPS and imagery services. Increasingly, militaries and intelligence forces seek partnerships and collaboration — both domestically across government agencies as well as via international joint assets, interoperability, and sharing information outputs. This trend in military doctrine supports the broader belief that space must be recognized as and treated as a shared resource, e.g., a global commons. The growing issue of space debris, as highlighted by the first-ever collision of satellites in early 2009, now poses a strategic military threat. As a result, governments will seek to identify a solution that spans military, civilian and commercials users. Related, is the need for enhanced space situational awareness. When combined with tighter militaries could offset costs and optimize military space capability through increased reliance on international relationships and more partnering with friends and allies.

Futron Image 1 + 2

Military space has recently received renewed attention. The prospect of anti-satellite weapons has moved to the forefront since China (in early 2007) and the United States (in early 2008) deployed missile technology to destroy satellites. These activities, considered alongside the unprecedented use of space to support war fighting by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, have caused officials the world over to take notice. Meanwhile, countries in all regions continue to fund and develop systems to boost their own ability to compete in the global military space segment. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments, this section of Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index provides a focused analysis of the comparative positions of the 10 leading space participant nations in the global military space segment. The analysis identifies the current key trends underlying military space competitiveness as follows:

  • The U.S. leadership in military space remains significant based on a significant head start, large budgets, organizational capacity, asset base and capability
  • U.S. military space leadership position will likely be reduced as near-peer challengers Russia and China continue to commit increased resources for military space
  • The U.S. could offset the gains of near-peer rivals by developing and deepening military relationships with friendly governments and allies, particularly with Europe, Japan and India
  • Passage of Japan’s new space law, when combined with North Korean ballistic activity will result in increase focused on military space
  • Europe has codified a coordinated military defense regime, which in the near-term could result in increased collaboration through and with NATO
  • India has procured new military space assets from Israel and, continues to institutionalize military space doctrine and command structure
  • Israel has emerged as the leading provider of Indian military space technology (and indeed a variety of military technology exports)
  • To reduce vulnerability from anti-satellite weapons, blinding, and orbital debris, there will be near term development and procurement of technologies related to space situational awareness, “hardening” technology, and directed energy weapons
  • Other “winning” military space technologies include COTM, Earth observation for intelligence and counter-terrorism, and the integration such as sensor networks and unmanned vehicles on the ground, air and sea
  • Political and economic limits reinforce military reliance on the commercial and private sector for a broadening array of military space services, and within U.S. and European spheres a large proportion of military space technology is derived from the private sector

Military space budget diagram

Futron seeks to use this focused segment analysis as a baseline for ongoing discussions regarding the relative competitive positions of national military space actors.

About The Global Military Space Segment Index
Futron’s Military Space Index currently employs three drivers to compare military space power among the 10 leading space participant countries. In subsequent versions of its Space Competitiveness Index, Futron will add additional metrics as more data becomes available or unclassified. We welcome feedback and suggestions on specific additional indicators.
Together, the three metrics listed next provide a high-level perspective into how national military space actors use their resources to maximize competitiveness. These three metrics are:
  • Military Budget: The amount of money allocated for military space activity within a country’s national budget (adjusted for PPP), which offers a relative ranking based on a quantitative measure of the resources made available for military space activity. Military Budget is weighted at 40 percent of the model findings
  • Military Doctrine and Structure: A qualitative indicator measuring consistent policy, strategy, planning, thought, and applicable organizational hierarchy for the development, operation, and application of military space. Military Doctrine and Structure accounts for 20 percent of the model outputs
  • Military Capability: The number of operational military satellites in orbit, plus military satellites planned for launch in the next year. This figure provides a quantitative indicator of a country’s military space capability. Military Capability is valued at 40 percent of the model.1

Futron selected these three metrics as they provide both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of the issues necessary to create a competitive program in this sector. When the decision is made to implement military space activity, the first critical step is to allocate funds. Thus, the budget metric seeks to quantitatively rank the estimated military space spending that is imperative for creating competitiveness in this sector. Funding priorities change based on the maturity of the country’s military space organization and asset base.

The second metric in the segment examines the existence of military space doctrine and structure—the policy, strategy, and hierarchy which defines how each country conducts its military space activities. Assessments of military space doctrine and structure, while qualitative, allow an evaluation of the extent to which military space budget and capability are used towards defined military space goals.

Space capability, the final metric, includes factors such as organizational development, ground assets, in-orbit assets, applied technologies, and processes such as command and control. Collectively these assets bridge the entire use of space by the military, from the satellite operator to the spacecraft to the ultimate user. For the purpose of this study, assets are limited to the number of space-borne assets that a country has in orbit; future reviews may include ground assets as well.

While Futron extensively researched the space military segment for our 2009 Space Competitiveness Index, an overarching assessment of this sector requires further examination and a more thorough reflection of competing schools of thought on military space power theory. Themes or questions that remain to be discussed or examined in future focused military space segment analysis include the following:
  • What are the limits of space-based force multiplication? A recent, public assessment on the limitations of space assets by the Israeli Air Force during the recent Gaza offensive highlighted both the importance and the limits of space capability.
  • What is the asymmetric strategic threat of militaries that highly leverage space assets? Our assessment does not directly assess such asymmetric implications
  • Futron’s military space analysis includes the assets of quasi-civilian organizations involved in national security operations, intelligence, counter-terrorism, secure communications, and paramilitary operations
  • Where sufficient information on dual-use assets—those that combine military-civilian or commercial-military space capabilities—was available, Futron incorporated these dual-use into its focused segment analysis, scaling their capabilities accordingly
  • Although “competitiveness” still applies in the military world, the outcomes of this analysis could be compared to “superiority” or “effectiveness” when discussing the disposition of different nations

While Futron is confident in the underlying facts and analysis of our findings, we view our framework as basis for additional assessments and study.

Segment Findings
Using the metrics of military space budget, capability, and doctrine and structure as a baseline, the two figures on Page 30 compare the 10 countries analyzed in Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index in their respective military space segments, highlighting both the current leadership position of the United States as well as the relative positions of its near-peers. While the U.S. retains military space preeminence, near-peers such as China and Russia continue to gain ground.

Military Space Budgets
Military space budgets are estimated from unclassified official sources and select non-official sources, or based upon overall national space spending or overall military budget trends. A clear distinction between military space and civil space spending is often blurred in the case of dual-use programs and applications. The ranked comparison, therefore, represents a best-estimate examination of military space funding in each of the 10 countries.

Futron estimates that the top 10 space powers spend more than PPP-adjusted US$71B annually on space, with the U.S. spending nearly US$50B. The percent of military spending allocated for space ranges from below 1 percent for Brazil, India, and Japan up to nearly 100 percent in the case of the Israel space budget. Our estimate for the U.S. is around 60 percent. These figures, of course, are estimates due to the classified nature of some spending, the complexity of dual-use assets, and spending on multinational alliances such as NATO and NORAD.

Europe represents a special case for the military space budget metric, as there is a collective European budget as well as individual country budgets. The total European military space budget metric examined all relevant budgets, whether national or collective, and assigned a ranking that balanced aggregate European military space spending against the need to compare Europe — as a militarily collaborative and politically integrated supranational region — equitably against other individual nations that feature a centralized military space budget. It is also important to note that Europe, under the auspices of the European Defense Agency, for the first time in 2008 publicly allocated money for European space initiatives. The rankings for this metric follow below.

Futron Figure 4

Military Space Doctrine And Structure
The military space doctrine ranks countries according to whether they have a developed doctrine, strategy, or policy that is used to coordinate a country’s military space activity. Some military space actors, such as the U.S., Europe, and China, have rather clear-cut doctrines and policies, while others have less formalized coordination mechanism within the government that are sometimes not codified or are not publicly available. Secondary doctrines, such as overall military doctrines — or a nuclear doctrine with space linkages, as in the case of India — can also assist in prioritizing and coordinating the military space activities of a given country.

This metric also examines a country’s organizational structure for military space — to the extent that one exists — and compares whether that structure indicates a greater or lesser competitive position. For countries that have well-developed military space units, two models of organization are prevalent. The first model is dispersal of units and activities throughout different parts of the government, typical of the various commands, units, and offices within the U.S. The second model is centralizing all military space activities within a single unit, typical of Russia’s independent space forces.

In evaluating the competitiveness of a country in space, it is challenging to assess which model provides a government with the most effective organization. Questions of efficiency, bureaucratic politics and processes, successful adoption of lessons learned, and implementation of programs all play a role in this determination. As these gradations are beyond the scope of this inaugural edition of Futron’s Space Competitiveness Index, this ranking considers the centralized Russian-style model to provide an organizational framework for military space activities that is the competitive equal or nearequal to the more dispersed U.S.-style model.

During 2008, several countries enhanced their military capability — and ranking — by developing new military strategies and/or doctrines as well as making organizational changes.

Japan passed a new law that enables military space activity, and quickly crafted a strategic report highlighting military space objectives. Canada reconstituted its military space organization and began updating its military strategy. Finally, Europe made some operations improvement is the way the continent defines, invests and procures military space assets. Not surprisingly, these activities positively impact each country’s rankings.

In terms of doctrinal innovation, the United States military is the furthest along in two pioneering advancements: the use of hosted payloads; and operationally responsive space (ORS). The concept of hosted payloads disaggregates the traditional satellite value-chain and manufacturing process by placing military payloads on commercial and civilian platforms. By focusing on the payload only, military planners are able to orbit assets more quickly and cheaply.

Figure 5

Time is condensed because the military payload are simply added to satellites currently in the planning or production phase — and presumably already have a scheduled launch slot. Ideally, using standardized interfaces, these payloads could be incorporated into “whichever” satellite is available. Cost is reduced because the secondary military payload shares a satellite bus, launch and some operational costs with the primary payload operator. The U.S. military has already piloted this concept and is discussions with several commercial and civilian entities to embed additional hosted payloads.

The ORS concept, which is driven forward by an independent office within the U.S. military, focuses on rapidly providing assured space power and assets to military commanders in a timely period. The end state of the ORS concept is capability to address emerging, urgent, and/or unanticipated via rapid augmentation, reconstitution and exploitation of assets. The ORS doctrine would use small satellites, gap fillers, standardized components, open architectures, etc., to quickly field space assets. The ORS doctrine differs from traditional processes for requirements setting, procurement, cost, and capability.

Europe has a unique doctrine and organization situation due to the complexity of European institutions and their overlapping relationships with a collection of countries. Within this institutional framework, European companies tend toward highly collaborative and supranational relationships, as well as individual country membership in NATO and the European Defense Agency (EDA). Futron includes these factors in our analysis of organizational structure, both has fundamental benefits as well as complications. The benefit of shared assets reduces costs and augments soft and hard power, but at the same time, decision-making is fragment as there no centralized military space command for Europe.

Against this analytic backdrop, Figure 5 above reveals the rankings in the military space doctrine and organizational structure metric.

Military Space Capability
The number of operational satellites serving military applications is a quantitative metric that counts those satellites believed to be currently active and serving a primary military function. Dual-use satellites and the unclear status of certain satellites posed minor challenges in counting.

For example, China does not clearly delineate its satellite functions in terms of military, civilian, or commercial use as other countries do, so the count of active Chinese military satellites may overlap with the count of Chinese satellites for other user types. The model of a commercial satellite being used by the military — not uncommon in the U.S. experience — is often reversed in the case of China: some Chinese satellites that are officially for military or classified are, in fact, employed for civilian or commercial purposes. Similarly, European military space assets feature a high degree of operational overlap among national, European-level, and NATO-level authorities.

It is important to note that several countries do not officially have military space assets, including Canada and Japan. For the purpose of the military space capability metric, European assets are aggregated into a unified capability, even though in actuality, specific resources are national, regional, or NATO assets, or some combination of the three. Despite such counting challenges, Futron was able to make comparisons among countries that it believes reflect space competitiveness in the metric of military on-orbit assets with high fidelity. The results are as follows.

Military Space Summaries By Country
The following section provides in brief information on military space for each country in the Space Competitiveness Index.

Officially headed by the Comando-Geral de Tecnologia Aerospacial, or CTA (Brazilian General Command for Aerospace Technology), there is little apparent official articulation of military space doctrine — although arguments by policymakers in favor of space spending have featured the military advantages of independent space access. In practice Brazil’s military space activity is very limited, focusing on international security issues such as border control and contraband. Toward that end, the military uses dual-use Earth observation products to monitor its large border and the Amazon, e.g., use of the two-satellite CBERS constellation, a joint China and Brazil program. The military’s communications requirements are met via the dual-use Brasilsat B-2 satellite.

After several years of drift, the Canadian government has reinvigorated its military space strategy, policy, and planning — and plan significant future developments. The previous policy effort, now more than 10 years old, responded to military requirements associated with the first Gulf War. Essential to the current plans are the reconstitution of theDirectorate of Space Development (D Space D) in 2008.

The Canadian military see space as both force multiplying, as well as central to the country’s integration with NATO and its special relationship with the United States, which include integrated participationin NORAD. D Space D will coordinate a number of on-going programs such as the Joint Space Support Program (JSSP), the Sapphire Program, the Near Earth Orbit Surveillance Satellite (NEOSsat), the Military Maritime Messaging Satellite (M3MSat), and Project Polar Epsilon (RADARSAT-2). The government also understands the national defense implications — and benefits — of the RADARSAT Constellation Mission. The Canadian military space policy has two primary objectives: exploit space as a medium to enhance military capability, domestically as well as in partnership, and project international leadership through an integrated capabilities-based policy of responsive space. While formalized, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy is leading an effort to finalize a new military space policy. D Space D has some 25 officers and contractors representing each of the branches of the Canadian armed forces.

Over the last several decades, China has consistently and effectively invested in developing military space capability through a robust program focused on developing technological capability and expanding regional coverage. While many Chinese programs are dual-use, China has built a sophistical organizational infrastructure supported by an research and development facilities, a robust industrial base, and has publicized its technical prowess in areas of launch vehicles, sensor capability, command and control know-how, anti-satellite technology, and a variety of other essential — and advanced — military space technologies. Supported by a strong organization and doctrine — most of which remains secret — the Chinese military is likely to continue with its high level of investment in space platforms and capabilities. While the force multiplication of these assets impact regional power — and gain ground with leaders of military space capability — in the near-term will lag the United States and Russian in terms of overall space capability.

While European military space capabilities lag their U.S. allies, there is growing realization in the significance of space assets, and importantly, a commitment to minimize the gap through increased investment, coordination and planning. Following an agreement between the European Commission (EC), the European Space Agency (ESA) and theEuropean Defence Agency (EDA), and supported by national initiatives, European militaries are keen to improve the broadest range of space capabilities — from communications and Earth observation to positioning, navigation and timing. In late 2008, the EDA sponsored a joint workshop with participants from 20 countries coordinate development of space technologies ensure non-dependence of strategic space technology, and position itself as a major space power and credible international partner. The EDA has several ongoing planning processes for military communications satellites, emerging satellite technology trends, industry trends, and a utilization study. Additional areas of EDA interest in include: multi-spectral imaging systems (MUSIS), space situation awareness, and data relay system.

On the communications front, coordination between NATO allies is driving consolidation of satellite communications systems. Currently, NATO, France, Germany (planned), Italy, and the U.K. maintain dedicated military communications satellites. The need for further coordination, coordination, has been supported by experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, where shortages in communications capacity, problems of interoperability and high cost of independent systems are pushing continued integration of allied communications platforms. Similar to the U.S., Europe is also increasing its dependence on commercial providers, with the U.K. having developed a public private partnerships with Paradigm, a subsidiary of EADS) to own and operating the SkyNet 5 communications satellites.

Funding — rather than technology, organization, or market structure — is the limiting factor to Europe’s
military space capability, and the current financial crisis magnifies the issue and threatens announced increases in investment. Estimates for European military space spending range from €500M to €1B (US$705M to US$1.4B) annually — significantly less than the U.S.; the largest budgets includes France, Italy and Germany which is investing in reconnaissance satellites. To meet their strategic needs, based on recent comments from the French Defense Minister, Europe will need to double its spending in the near term.

As a way of stretching money further, a number of European countries are pooling their assets. The U.K.’s SkyNet 5, France’s Syracuse 3, and Italy’s Sicral satellites will jointly provide NATO’s new communications satellites and NATO has inked a long-term lease of about a third of Syracuse 3A’s nine transponders of super-high frequency (SHF) transmissions under a contract with France, Britain, and Italy. France and Italy are also looking at a largely military dual use geosynchronous satellite called Athena-Fidus. It would be capable of very high rates of data transmission and could augment or even replace some of the Syracuse and Sicral satellites.

In a development that parallels the U.S. organization of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the EDA is preparing the establishment of a Procurement Cell to coordinate the EU Member States’ orders of commercial satellite communications services. The European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell will be a three-year pilot project (2010 - 2012) to gain practical experience with centralizing commercial SATCOM procurement at the EU level. The cell’s activities could reach a business volume of at least €30M (US$42M) per year.

A central booking office would initially be hosted at EDA’s premises. It would manage the technical and financial aspects of the requests and orders placed by the Member States with the capacity and service offers by satellite operators and telecom companies. After the end of the pilot period, the SATCOM Procurement Cell activities are intended to be transferred to an appropriate entity for permanent operations for the EU Member States. The U.K. uses an outsourced model with Paradigm, and this business model may spread to other countries such as France, and Germany. It is estimated that only 20 percent of European military communications capacity is procured commercially.

Military space in India is tied to a large revamp of the country’s armed forces that includes significant new investment and organizational change. As India procures new air, ground and sea platforms, satellite communications requirements will dramatically increase, which in turn could drive equipment markets for COTM. Increased interest in and purchase of UAVs are core the country’s planned projection of power and capability along its frontier. Purchase of commercial space segment by the military, however, for two critical reasons: India’s commercial satellite communications market is closed, so international commercial providers have not focused on the market; and second, India’s military requirements in the near term are likely to remain in region.

During 2008, India announced plans to create an Integrated Space Cell, a nodal agency within the Government of India that coordinates space-based military and civilian systems. A key factor in the creation of the Cell was China’s anti-satellite test. The Cell, formed in June 2008, is under the command of the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters, and is responsible for coordinating activities of ISRO and the Indian Armed Forces. On the EO front, India has targeted enhanced military capability — a process that is distinctly tied to the country’s growing military relationship with Israel. India has both launched military satellites for Israel, TECSAR, and launched a similar Israeli-built, Indian-operated, RISAT-1 payload in early 2009.< br />
Israel’s military space activity focuses mainly of the Shavit small launch vehicle and the Ofek reconnaissance satellite series. In the past two years, Israel has begun to transition both its launch and satellite development programs toward partnership with India. The future of Israeli military space investment is highly contingent and as of early 2009, the question was in effect tabled by Israeli decision-makers pending the outcome of the Israeli elections.

Japan’s New Basic Space Law (August 2008) overturned a 40-year prohibition on any military space activity. The Basic Law for Space Activities, which formally allowed Japan to use space for national security purposes and is the result of a series of meetings conducted from September through December by a Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) committee chaired by Seigo Kitamura, Japan’s senior vice minister of defense, according to Takashi Sekine, director of MoD’s International Public Affairs Office. The law also required the formulation of a report, the Basic Guidelines for the Development and Use of Outer Space, which was published in January 2009. While short on detail, the report is a first step in identifying systems and technologies that Japan will seek to develop as part of its emerging military space strategy. The document identifies a number of space capabilities including:
  • More and higher-resolution imaging satellites to complement the nation’s existing fleet of fourInformation Gathering Satellites (IGS)
  • A dedicated military communications satellite
  • A missile warning satellite — or a missile warning payload hosted aboard another satellite — to support the nation’s Aegis ballistic missile defense system
  • Small, low-cost satellites and rockets that can be launched on short-notice, perhaps from aircraft
  • A signals intelligence satellite
  • An independent navigation and positioning capability
  • Satellite protection and space situational awareness capabilities

As these changes cascade, the new space law will have a dramatic impact of Japanese military space activity. Driven in part by activity in North Korea, the government’s new policy allows for the use of space in national self-defense. This change in policy comes on the heels of broader changes in the Japanese military mission that place new information and communications demands on the military.

As Japan’s forces evolve in the near term, there will invariably be increased demand for advanced communications, which may drive military purchase of commercial capacity for overseas missions. Also in response to policy changes, there have been a number of inter-governmental discussions about dual-use assets and programs. The full impact of this new military space doctrine will take several years to understand, but over the next several years, the Japanese military will place increasing importance on and resources in military space activities.

Russia maintains a long-standing history and organization of military space activities, included an integrated command and control hierarchy with the military establishment. TheRussian Space Force, a centralized military command structure overseeing some 40,000 personnel, supports the country’s long-standing military space doctrine. Central to Russia’s space doctrine is a Kosmos series of military surveillance and communications satellites. Overall, however, military doctrine lacks transparency and there is discourse surrounding Russian military doctrine.

The Russian military — like the U.S. military — is highly dependent on space-based communications services. Russia employs a satellite-based early warning detection system. Russia’s GLONASS system is central to military space strategy, providing positioning, navigation, and timing services. Russia also operates the Strela LEO constellation and the Raduga GEO network. Overall, the Russian military has approximately 38 active satellites providing communications, PNT, and reconnaissance services.

Futron research was not able to locate any publicly available reports that articulated South Korean military space doctrine or official military space policy. That said, the South Korean military is likely to become a major implementer of COTM technology, particularly in response to recent North Korean missile activity. South Korea does operate a dual-use communications satellite, Koreasat 5 (Mugungwha 5), launched in 2006. The payload reported carries 12 military relay terminals and 24 commercial terminals, with military coverage from the Malacca Strait to the central Pacific Ocean areas.

The U.S. has a developed, transparent, and evolving military space doctrine, aligned with a complex operational structure. There is an ongoing discourse surrounding unclassified portions of military space doctrine and related subjects — such as Space Power Theory — although significant portions of the strategy remain classified. U.S. military doctrine is somewhat integrated into the country’s larger national space strategy. In general terms there is emphasis on retaining a national lead in space situational awareness, military reconnaissance, and responsive space in order to combat anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) and asymmetric threats. The focus is on development of state-of-the-art technologies to maintain comparative national advantage in space. In addition, the U.S. military space doctrine is the one that overtly aims at “leading” the world.

Without going into detail of the complexity of the U.S. military space organization, several important happenings occurred during 2008 and early 2009. First is the establishment of the ORS Office, which as discussed, represents a potential paradigm shift that could cascade throughout the entire military space organizational. Second is the cancellation of two large military programs — BASIC, which was focused on high-end observation satellites, and the termination of the US$26B transformational satellite program, TSAT; the military, instead, will purchase two more advanced extremely high frequency satellites as alternatives. Looking forward, these decisions will facilitate the continued and increased reliance on commercial vendors for imaging and communications solutions, as well as expand plans for hosted payloads and ORS activity. The U.S. is also a leader in the use of COTM as well as the use of commercial satellite capacity, and it is estimated that some 80 percent of U.S. communications activity is procured commercially.

Future Global Military Segment Study Goals
The purpose of the Global Military Index is to distill the debate about military space and the balance of space-based capabilities in both war and peace. In the future, Futron plans to enhance its focused analysis of the global military space segment in the following ways:
  • Expand capability metric to include ground and application technologies, as well as new technology development and the quality of the assets
  • Improved information on worldwide military space budget trends, with a focus on distinguishing between the often non-exclusive relationship between military and civil government activity
  • Identify a group of leading experts to provide additional qualitative insight and analysis to support the data
  • Identify appropriate metrics to measure the value of human resources with respect to military space capacity through skills, training, and career progression
  • Identify ways to quantify asymmetric military space vulnerability
  • Review information regarding defense spending on space R&D efforts

Thanks from Futron...
Futron Corporation would like to thank those people and organization who supported (and
continue to support) our ongoing efforts to characterize global space competitiveness, including those providing information on background and confidentially. Futron would like expressly thank a few external contributors in particular:

Canada-based AppSpace Solutions, for providing insight into Canada’s space sector. The mission of AppSpace Solutions is to assist space industry leaders and organizations in making informed decisions about spacecraft applications. The company is led by Wayne A. Ellis, BSc, MSc, CD, who has more than 20 years of Canadian military experience, primarily in space systems education and applications. He has designed, developed and delivered space-related educational content for audiences from grade school children to senior government officials, and has provided space expertise to multiple levels of the Canadian military.

Dr. Young-Keun Chang, for reviewing the sections on North and South Korea. Dr. Chang is a professor in the Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering and a director of the Space System Research Lab at Korea Aerospace University, South Korea. He is also a Program Director of National Space R&D of Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF), a government-funded institute. Dr. Chang was previously a principal researcher responsible for the development of KOMPSAT-1 in Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). His current projects include development of nano- and micro-satellites, including Hannuri-2 and Hannuri-3, and training future aerospace engineers at Korea Aerospace University.

Dr. Raz Tamir and Dr. Meidad Parientes for providing insight into the Israeli space sector. Both Dr. Tamir and Dr. Parientes work on the AMOS satellite program and are founding members of the Israeli Nanosatellite Association (INSA). Additional support came from Mr. Tal Inbar of the Fischer Institute of Space Studies as well as from Mr. Daniel Rockberger, a mechanical engineer and graduate of the International Space University.

Futron would also like to thank others that provided confidential feedback to our 2009 edition, and we look forward to comments and suggests from our readers to enhance the Space Competitiveness Index in the future.

Tech_Journal: IAEA Releases New Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program » FAS Strategic Security Blog

IAEA Releases New Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program » FAS Strategic Security Blog

In distinction to this and showing that peace and not war is the proper way to go, please see:

Did war with Iran get mainstreamed after all? - By Stephen M. Walt | Stephen M. Walt

Posted By Stephen M. Walt

Back in August 2010, I wrote a post warning about the possibility that war with Iran was being "mainstreamed." My concern was the likelihood that incessant talk of war would gradually accustom people to the idea and harden perceptions to the point that eventually even former skeptics would be convinced that war was inevitable and that we might as well get it over with. As I put it back then:
If you talk about going to war often enough and for long enough, people get used to the idea and some will even begin to think if it is bound to happen sooner or later, than "'twere better to be done quickly." In an inside-the-Beltway culture where being "tough" is especially prized, it is easy for those who oppose "decisive" action to get worn down and marginalized. If war with Iran comes to be seen as a "default" condition, then it will be increasingly difficult for cooler heads (including President Obama himself) to say no.
I now wonder if my concerns were understated, and the danger a bit more subtle. It appears that we have gone beyond just talking about military action to actually engaging in it, albeit at a low level. In addition to waging cyberwar via Stuxnet, the United States and/or Israel appear to be engaged in covert efforts to blow up Iranian facilities and murder Iranian scientists. Earlier this week, the CIA lost a reconnaissance drone over Iranian territory (whether Iran shot it down or not is disputed). And just as I'd feared, this situation has led smart and normally sober people like Andrew Sullivan and Roger Cohen to endorse this shadowy campaign, on the grounds that it is preferable to all-out war.
I certainly agree that what the United States is doing is better than launching an all-out attack, but I question this approach on three grounds. First, as I've already argued elsewhere, our preoccupation with Iran vastly overstates its capabilities and the actual threat it poses to U.S. interests. Iran is a minor military power at present, and it has no meaningful power projection capabilities. It has been pursuing some sort of nuclear capability for decades without getting there, which makes one wonder whether Iran intends to ever cross the nuclear weapons threshold. Even if it did, it could not use a bomb against us or against Israel without triggering its own destruction, and there is no sign that Iran's leadership is suicidal. Quite the contrary, in fact: the clerics seem more concerned with staying alive and staying in power than anything else. Iran's "revolutionary" ideology is old and tired and inspires no one. The "Arab Spring" has underscored Iran's irrelevance as a political force, Iran's Syrian ally is under siege and may yet fall, and the ongoing U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will remove a key source of Iranian-Iraqi solidarity and encourage Arab-Persian differences to reemerge once again. Iran is a problem but a relatively minor one, and it is a sign of our collective strategic myopia that U.S. leaders either cannot figure this out or cannot say so openly.
Second, waging a covert, low-level war is not without risks, including the risk of undesirable escalation. No matter how carefully we try to control the level of force, there's always the danger that matters spiral out of control. Iran can't do much to us militarily, but it can cause trouble in limited ways and it could certainly take steps that would jack up oil prices and possibly derail the fragile global economic recovery. Moreover, if some U.S. operation misfired and a couple of hundred Iranians died, wouldn't the revolutionary government feel compelled to respond? If U.S. or Israeli operatives are captured on Iranian soil, will pressure mount on us to do more? (Just imagine what all the GOP candidates would start saying!) Such developments may not be likely, of course, but it would be foolhardy to ignore such possibilities entirely. Nor should we ignore the possibility that others will learn from this sort of "unconventional" campaign and one day use similar tactics against U.S. allies or the United States itself.
Third, a semi-secret war of this kind raises the inevitable risk of "blowback." The late Chalmers Johnson defined blowback as the unintended consequences of U.S. action abroad, and especially those actions of which the public is largely unaware. When we conduct semi-secret, not-quite wars in other countries, the targets sometime try to hit us back. When they do, many people back home will see their actions as unjustified aggression, and as evidence that our enemies are irrevocably hostile and unremittingly evil.
A case in point is the alleged Iranian plot to get Mexican drug lords to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Americans immediately concluded that this scheme was a sign of dastardly Iranian perfidy, when it might just as easily have been a harebrained Iranian riposte to what we were already doing. This is not to say that Iran was justified in trying to blow up a building in our nation's capital, but by what logic is peace-loving America justified in doing something similar over in Iran? In short: If the American people don't quite know what their government is up to, they cannot understand or interpret what other states are doing either. We may have good reasons not to like what others are doing, but the bigger danger is that we simply won't understand it, and won't understand our own role in helping bring such actions about.
Lastly, ratcheting up military pressure -- even if done covertly and at a relatively low level -- can only reaffirm deeply rooted Iranian suspicions of the United States and prolong U.S.-Iranian animosity. (The same is true in reverse, of course). I'm under no illusions about the depths of this animosity and the degree of skill, imagination, and patience it would take to unravel it, but doing more of the same is not going to make it any easier. Yes, many Iranians loathe the regime and would like it to go, but that doesn't mean they welcome U.S. or Israeli attacks on Iranian soil. And that is especially true of attacks on the nuclear program, which Iranians of many political persuasions view as an important symbol of national pride.
In short, the "silent campaign" against Iran is not without its own risks and costs. It is preferable to all-out attack, but a silent war and an all-out war are not the only options. The third option is a sustained and patient effort to reengage with Iran, in order to convince Iranian leaders that they are better off not going nuclear and that both sides will be better off if we can gradually work out some of our differences. Such an approach does not require the United States to sacrifice any core interests, nor would it preclude continuing to press Iran on its human rights record and on other matters that trouble us. And maybe it won't work. But as Trita Parsi shows in his new book A Single Roll of the Dice, that alternative approach has never really been tried.

Satelite Capabilities Of Emerging Space-Competant States

Satelite Capabilities Of Emerging Space-Competant States:

Satelite Capabilities Of Emerging Space-Competant States

Gerald M. Steinberg

The military role of space satellites has increased continuously over the past three decades. In the early 1960s, the first reconnaissance satellites were launched by the United States, and the Soviet Union followed within a few years. In addition, military communications, navigation, meteorology and other satellites were developed during this period. By the 1980s, systems such as the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS), as well as reconnaissance satellites (Keyhole, KH-11, Lacrosse, etc.) were of major importance in the military balance.
Most of this activity has been undertaken by the major powers; the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), and China. France and the European Space Agency have also devoted considerable resources in this area, such as in the development of the Helios reconnaissance satellite. (The British military space program has been relatively limited, compared to the other major powers.) Until the 1980s, these were the only states with the capability to develop satellites and launch them into orbit. Although commercial launch services allowed many other states to develop civilian satellites, mainly for communications and scientific research, these satellites had little military utility.
However, in recent years, the number of states with indigenous launch capabilities has grown. In addition to the major space powers (US, Russia, China, and the European Space Agency), Japan, India, and Israel have placed satellites into orbit. (In 1967, Australia used a modified US Redstone booster to launch a small satellite, but cannot be said to have an ongoing launch capability. Iraq was also reported to be seeking an independent military space capability, and on December 5, 1989, launched a three-stage Al-Abid missile, but no satellite was placed in orbit.1) Canada, Italy, Britain, Norway, and other advanced industrial states have designed, produced and operated advanced satellite systems that were launched commercially. In addition, Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan and South Africa have developed some independent capability to produce (but not launch) satellites, including imaging and communications systems.
The rate at which different states develop the ability to operate in space has been the subject of many studies and much debate. This debate focuses on two central issues; 1)the military uses of satellite systems and concerns regarding the impact on international stability and potential for an arms race in space, and 2)the degree to which states that are not major space powers or advanced industrialized economies will have access to space capabilities for commercial, technological, and national security purposes.2
Technically, as is frequently noted, there is no clear difference between civil and military satellite systems. Orbital imagers and communications satellites are prime examples of dual-use technologies. As a recent US Congressional Research Service report notes, "The distinction between military and civilian launches is arbitrary to a certain extent, since any satellite can be used for either sector. For example, communication satellites can carry either military or civilian traffic, and navigation satellites are used by both the military and civilian communities."3
The potential military impact of dual-use systems is most salient with respect to imaging and reconnaissance satellites. For many years, the French SPOT (Satellite Pour l'Observation de la Terre) has provided a limited surveillance and imaging capability for states and non-governmental organizations that lack an indigenous capability. Additional systems operated by governments and firms from Russia, the United States, Japan, and potentially, other states, will provide more options and higher resolution in the next few years.
As a result, the importance of military space systems and dual-use satellites in regional conflicts and "emerging space competent states" (second or third tier space nations)4 is likely to increase. As will be discussed in this paper, these capabilities can alter the military balance and stability in a number of regions and conflict systems. However, as will also be demonstrated, the commercial space and imaging platforms of the major (or first tier) space powers are likely to have a far greater impact. The high resolution commercial satellites being developed in the US, Russia, France and Japan, and the competition between them, will be a source of instability in both regional and global conflict systems.5
With respect to the issue of access to space capabilities and technology, as will be seen in this study, in many areas, the number of "emerging space competent states" is growing, despite significant technical and economic obstacles. With the notable exception of India and Israel, the ability of most states to develop a high level of autonomy, including indigenous launchers, has been limited by the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and similar measures. Space launcher and missile development programs (which are closely linked and provide another important example of dual-use technology) in Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan and other states have been severely curtailed as a result of these restrictions and the difficulties and costs inherent in obtaining the necessary technology.
However, this trend has been offset to a high degree by an increase in the availability of commercial launch services. In addition to the US and the ESA, Russia and China offer a range of services, and competition between these commercial launchers is intense. Through these services, "emerging space competent states" can contract for the launch of indigenously designed, produced, and operated commercial and research satellites. Thus, access to advanced space capability for many states has actually increased.
I. The Capabilities of Emerging Space-Competant States
For a number of regional powers, the capacity to launch satellites into earth orbit is closely linked to ballistic missile development efforts. Technically, once a state develops an intercontinental or intermediate range ballistic missile (ICBM or IRBM), this can also be used to place a small payload into low earth orbit. (It should be noted that the first satellite launchers used by the major powers were also developed initially as ballistic missiles.) In this way, the economic cost of developing a satellite launcher is largely absorbed by missile development programs, and the space launcher is a low-cost bonus.
While economic, military and strategic considerations provide the primary motivations for the development of indigenous ballistic missiles, space launchers and satellites, national prestige and pride also play an important role. The public visibility of technological achievements in this area is used by governments to gain additional financing for these projects.
However, the technical complexity and high cost of developing these technologies have limited the number of non-OECD states that have succeeded in developing an indigenous space launcher capability to India and Israel. Other states, such as Brazil and perhaps Pakistan, have initiated programs designed to reach this objective, but the high costs and limits placed by the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as unilateral export controls imposed by the US have slowed or blocked these efforts. This situation is unlikely to change in the next five years.
A. India
India has the most active and advanced space program among the emerging space powers. The Indian Space Research Office (ISRO), based in Bangalore, declares that all of its programs are "intended for peaceful purposes", with specific emphasis on satellite communications and survey of earth resources. Research and development activities related to satellites and launch vehicles are "designed to contribute towards achieving the above goals."6
The Indian space efforts can be traced to a research and development program that began in the early 1950s. In 1975, India built the Aryabhata research satellite which was launched by a Soviet launcher, followed by Bhaskara 1 in 1979, and Bhaskara 2 in 1981. On July 18, 1980 an Indian launcher (the SLV-3) placed a 35 kilogram satellite (Rohini 1) in low earth orbit. As Smith notes, by this achievement, India became the first developing country to launch its own satellite on its own launch vehicle.7 This was followed by the launch of the Rohini 2 on May 31, 1981 (which was in a very low orbit and decayed after 9 days), the Rohini 3 on April 17, 1983 (a 41.5kg. experimental research satellite), the RS-I (Rohini Satellite) and RS-D-I (Rohini Satellite for Development).
In this area, as in other technology-intensive sectors, the Indian government placed a high priority on developing an indigenous capability and overcoming external factors that were deemed to be obstacles to national economic and military development.8 Officially, the 1993 budget of the Indian space program was very small, but this may not include booster development and other costs that are included in the military or other budgets. According to unofficial estimates, between 1980 and 1990, the Indian government allocated $1 billion for space research, including the development of satellites for telecommunications, meteorology, and imaging.9
In contrast to the situation in most other countries, the Indian space launcher did not grow directly out of a ballistic missile development effort. Indeed, the order seems to be reversed, with the missile application following the successful testing of a space booster. Missile development began in earnest in the early 1980s, and in 1983, the Chairman of ISRO indicated that the space program would lead to an IRBM capability.10 Indeed, the Integrated Guided Missile Program led to the development of the Prithvi tactical SSM, with a range of 250km. (first tested in February 1988). The major Indian effort is the Agni IRBM, with a range of 2500km. and a payload estimated at from 1 to 2.5 tons. However, its guidance system, first stage rocket engine and other components were imported.11 The first tests of the Agni took place in 1989, and production is not expected to begin until the late 1990s.
The Indian SLV family has three basic variations; 1) the ASLV (Augmented SLV), which is designed to place a 150kg. payload into a 500km. orbit; 2) the 4 stage Polar SLV, designed for an orbit of 900km.; and 3) a geostationary launcher (GSLV) with a declared payload of 1900kg. The first and third stages of the PSLV use solid propellant, and the second and fourth stages are liquid propellant engines. The GSLV has four additional liquid strap-on motors, and the third and fourth stages are replaced by one cryogenic stage12. Three launch sites are also being built; Sriharikota (the main launch site), Trivadrum, and Balasore.13 The launch vehicle development program has been plagued by a number of failures. An SLV tested failed in 1979, and the first ASLV tests failed in March 1987 and July 1988, but in 1992, succeeded in placing the SROSS-C scientific research satellite into orbit (although here too, the fourth stage of the launcher did not perform optimally and the satellite's orbit was lower than planned). The first flight of the PSLV in September 1993 also failed and an IRS-E satellite was lost, but in October 1994, this system was used successfully to place an IRS-P2 imaging satellite into polar orbit.
In the effort to upgrade its booster capability, India sought to purchase cryogenic engines and technology from Russia in the early 1990s. According to reports, 80% of the "know how" was transferred, but then American pressure on Russia to adhere to the requirements of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) led Moscow to renegotiate this contract.14
In the area of satellite development, India has active communications and reconnaissance satellite development programs. The first Indian communications satellite, APPLE, was launched in June 1991 by the Ariane launcher. The major Indian effort in this area is concentrated in the INSAT series. INSAT 1A failed to operate properly, but INSAT 1B, built by Ford Aerospace and launched from the U.S. Challenger Space Shuttle in August 1983 was successful (it decayed in 1991). Additional satellites in this series include INSAT 1C (launched by Ariane in 1988), INSAT 1D (launched by a U.S. Delta rocket in 1992).
INSAT 2A was built indigenously by the Indian Space Research Organization (using some imported technology) and launched in July 1992 by an Ariane-4 launcher. In addition to communications technology, this multipurpose satellite also contained a meteorological imaging system. INSAT 2B was launched in July 1993.15 In mid-1995, the upgraded GSLV launcher is scheduled to place a 2,500kg. communications spacecraft into geosynchronous orbit.16 In addition, there are reports that India has contracted for the launch of the Gramsat communications satellite aboard a Russian booster.17
India has also given high priority to the development of imaging satellites. In 1987, a Soviet launcher placed the Indian-built IRS-1A satellite into orbit. This payload includes an monochrome imager with a resolution of 36 meters, and a 73 meter multispectral system.18 The IRS-1B was launched in 1991, and in October 1994, the IRS-P2 earth observation spacecraft was placed in polar orbit. This satellite is equipped with a linear imaging scanner based on an advanced CCD array, providing a resolution of 40m. in 4 spectral bands.19
According to a document of the Indian Space Agency, "Several advanced Indian remote sensing spacecraft are planned as part of a continuing PSLV launch series. These will include Indian multispectral linear arrays with resolutions as high as 10 meters, making them somewhat comparable with current SPOT class spacecraft."20 The IRS-1C, scheduled to be launched by Russia, is expected to have similar characteristics.21 It should be noted that the Indian Space Agency has signed an agreement with EOSAT (a private US firm) to market space images.
According to the Indian government, the imaging satellites are designed for civilian purposes, such as estimating agricultural yields, mapping water resources and for flood monitoring. However, as noted, imaging satellites are dual use systems with military potential. The military focus of the Indian surveillance satellites is apparently Chinese and Pakistani military facilities, including the Kahuta nuclear weapons production complex and the Kanachi naval base.22 India has used aerial reconnaissance for this mission, including the MIG-25 Foxbat B, equipped with five camera ports and with a photographic range of 100km. Manned overflights involve significant risks of interception by aircraft or missiles, while satellites involve no such risks.
B. Israel
Israel, like India, has an advanced scientific infrastructure, and this has led to continuing space-related activity. The Israeli Space Agency (ISA) was founded in 1983, and much of the activity focused on basic research and development, in conjunction with the American and European civil space programs. The ISA's formal budget is very small ($6 million in 1993) but this does not include development and operational costs for the Ofeq and Amos satellites. Israel reportedly spent $1 billion through 1993 on the Ofeq satellite program. Other unverified reports claim that the Defense Ministry allocates $20 million a year for Ofeq, although this seems to be an underestimate.23 (Gross estimates place the cost of development and launch of a first-generation imaging satellite at $400 million.24) Nevertheless, high costs and budgetary limitations delayed the planned launch of Ofeq-3 for as much as two years.
Like other strategic technologies and weapons, the Israeli government provides little official information regarding space launchers and satellites. However, using available information and drawing logical inferences, the outlines of the Israeli program can be discerned. The Shavit (Comet) launchers are apparently based on what is commonly referred to as the Jericho ballistic missile. According to speculation, the Jericho is part of Israel's assured second-strike nuclear deterrent. The Jericho I reportedly carries a payload of 500kg. to a 500km. range, and the more advanced Jericho-2 (in some sources, Jericho-2B or Jericho 3) is estimated to have a range of 1450 to 2800km. and a payload of 1000kg.25 The first two solid rocket engines of the Shavit are manufactured by TAAS (formerly Israel Military Industries), and the third stage motor was designed and produced by Rafael (the Arms Development Research Authority). Israeli Aircraft Industries is the prime contractor.
IAI has sought to recover some of the costs of launcher development through commercial booster services, but with little success. Moshe Keret, IAI's president, blames "political issues" for these obstacles, but claims that these have eased with the Middle East peace process. "Now we have a new opportunity to approach the market, so we will renew our booster marketing efforts."26 However, US missile technology control requirements and the claim that the Israeli launcher is subsidized by the government and military, may continue to block these efforts.27
IAI has announced plans to produce the "Next" launcher, which will be able to place a 300kg. payload into polar orbit. Israel is reportedly planning to enter this launcher in the second phase of NASA's ultralight satellite booster competition. IAI has attempted to create links with US firms (Space Vector and Atlantic Research) to market the Shavit. In this partnership, IAI will provide the first and second rocket motor cases, Rafael will supply the 3rd stage, Atlantic Research will load them with propellant, and Space Vector will integrate and launch the vehicle.28 The NEXT launcher is also being considered for the ELLIPSAT communications satellite system. This 14 satellite system is designed to provide communications for the northern hemisphere. IAI reportedly purchased 10% of the stock in the lead firm, Mobile Communications Holding Inc.29
Early warning and real-time reconnaissance have always been of major importance to Israel defense planners in offsetting the threat to national survival posed by the massive conventional forces of the neighboring Arab states. Israeli defense industries developed a number of mini-RPVs for use as overhead reconnaissance platforms, and these were used extensively during the 1982 Lebanon war.
As part of strategic cooperation with the United States, Israel received sporadic access to American satellite information, (including images of the Entebbe airport used in planning the rescue operation in 1976), but this is not consistent or sufficient.30 Former Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur noted that immediately prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the US withheld critical intelligence information regarding Arab plans to attack. Similarly, Meir Amit, who served as head of the Israeli Mossad, has referred to the 'crumbs' of satellite intelligence that Israel has received, noting that this "is very inconvenient and very difficult".31
Israel security concerns extend to the nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities being developed by Iran and Iraq. The events prior to the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the failures of US intelligence with respect to the Iraqi missile and nuclear weapons program, and the inability of the United States to locate and destroy the Iraqi Scud missile launchers during the war increased Israeli focus on obtaining an indigenous capability.32 The Jerusalem Post quoted an Israeli Defense Ministry official as saying that, "For years we have been begging the Americans for more detailed pictures from their satellites and often got refusals - even when Iraqi Scud missiles were falling on Tel Aviv. ...The Americans have also done their best to deny us all help in building our own reconnaissance satellite."33 After the war, Defense Minister Arens explicitly and publicly declared Israel's intention of launching an indigenous reconnaissance satellite.34
In 1988, Israel launched the Ofeq (Horizon) 1 test satellite, using the Shavit (Comet) launcher. The launch site is on the Mediterranean Coast near Palmachim. To avoid flying over other countries, a highly unusual flight path was used which headed northwest over the Mediterranean, placing the satellite into a retrograde orbit at an inclination of 143 .35 The 156kg. satellite was reported to be a test vehicle designed to lead to the development of an orbital reconnaissance capability, and it reentered Earth's atmosphere in January 1989. Ofeq's orbit limited the satellite's view to areas 37 north and south of the equator. Ofeq 2 was similar in weight and technical characteristics to Ofeq 1. It was launched in April 1990 and had an orbital lifetime of 3 months.36 Both were spin stabilized.
The Ofeq 3, launched April 5 1995, weighed 225kg. at launch, including a 36kg. payload. Its higher perigee (369km.) and orbital maneuvering capability allows for a longer lifetime (one to 3 years). (According to reports in the Israeli press, this version of the Shavit launcher included a small new IAI rocket engine with 674lb. of thrust.37) Its orbit will take it over sites in the Middle East, including Iraq, on most passes during the first months of operation. This version of Ofeq has small thrusters for three-axis stabilization and attitude control with an accuracy of 0.1 degree.38
Officially, the head of the Israeli Space Agency described Ofeq 3 as "a very sophisticated platform on which many things can be placed".39 In particular, Ofeq 3 is reported to be a first-generation imaging satellite, including ultraviolet and visible imaging sensors. Reports that this system could "read license plates in Baghdad" are clearly exaggerated, and for an operational system, Israel will need a number of reconnaissance satellites capable of monitoring various targets. In addition, a data analysis unit to interpret images will require a very large budget. The head of the ISA has noted that Ofeq technology would not replace Israel's request for access to US satellites, particularly in the context of a peace agreement with Syria. In addition, the requirement for an early warning satellite for detecting missile launches would require a geostationary orbit, which is far beyond Israel's current capability.40
A number of Israeli firms have been developing technology for orbital surveillance, including El-Op (camera to photograph 100km. strips to a resolution of 16 meters), Elisra and Tadiran (communications systems), Rafael (thrusters), Elta (antennas), the Dimona nuclear center (vacuum chambers), IAI/Melam (solar cells), IAI/Tamam (gyros and magnometer).41 It is not clear which of this technology is incorporated in Ofeq 3.
In addition to military reconnaissance, IAI and the ISA are also investing in commercial space ventures, (although there are reports that Israel has rejected requests from other states to purchase Ofeq satellites.42) Aby Har-Even, the head of the ISA, has stated that future commercial versions of Ofeq could include sensors, cameras, and communications equipment.43 According to unconfirmed reports, IAI is developing the EROS (Earth Resources Orbiting Satellite) with 2-3 meter resolution capability, and has reportedly signed a contract with Core Software Technology to market these images.44
In the area of communications satellites, Israel is developing the Amos 1, equipped with 7 Ku-band transponders. IAI has signed a contract with Ariane to place this satellite in geosynchronous orbit in December 1995. Amos is a civil commercial satellite developed by IAI at a reported cost of $150 million.45 IAI is reported to be interested in selling future Amos satellites and providing operating services to Asian, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern countries.46 The operating services will be supplied through Satellite Communications Corp. Ltd.47
The Israel Institute of Technology (Technion) is also active in space research and development. Technion students developed the 52kg. Gerwin 1-Techsat (at a cost of $4 million), which was launched in March on a converted Russian SS-25 (Start I) booster, but this launch failed.48 In 1990, the Technion signed an agreement with the USSR for cooperation in scientific engineering and research on x- ray astronomy, planetary exploration, instrumentation, solar-terrestrial physics, earth remote sensing and ecological monitoring.49 The Israel Space Agency signed a government-to-government agreement with Russia in 1993, and the ISA's TAUVEX (Tel-Aviv Ultraviolet Explorer) is expected to be launched on Russia's Spectrum-x/Gamma satellite.
C. Brazil
The Organizing Group of the National Commission for Space Activities (GOCNAE) was created in 1961, in order "to provide Brazil with the infrastructure necessary for the exploration of outer space".50 In 1981 the Brazilian Complete Space Mission (MECB) was created by the federal government to achieve self-sufficiency in space programs. This program is coordinated by the Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE) and involves both civilian and military bodies (Ministry of Aeronautics, Secretary of Science and Technology). Goals included the production of launch vehicles, and satellites. Before being transferred to civilian authority in 1969, Brazil's space program was part of the Navy, and in the 1980s, according to Karp, its higher echelon was still composed largely of military officers, "suggesting that military applications have not been overlooked".51
In the early 1960s the SONDA sounding rocket series program began at Avibras (a private company that produces most of Brazil's missiles and rockets), which led to the development of Sonda I (2 stage, solid propellant, 75km. range), Sonda II and Sonda III (2-stage solid propelled, 500km. range and 50-160kg. payload). The Sonda 4 rocket was intended to test the major propulsion components of a future space launch vehicle (VLS) and was designed to achieve a range of 600 kilometers with a payload of 500kg.52 The VLS is a four stage rocket designed to place 200kg. in an orbit of 250-1000km. The VLS-R2 reportedly completed a successful test flight.53 In 1989, a one-third size development version of the VLS was tested. The Air Force "Barreira do Inferno" (Hell's Barrier) has been used for Sonda testing, and work has begun on a new launch site for low and geostationary orbit satellites, the Alcantara Launch Centre (CLA), in the State of Maranhao.
However, in the past five years, the pace of development in this area has slowed significantly, and in the 1980's, VLS appropriations dropped from $600m to $170m. In 1989, the Avibras SS-300 ballistic missile project was suspended due to lack of funding, and Avibras declared bankruptcy in 1990 after Iraq refused to pay for artillery ordered during Iran/Iraq War. The National Space Research Institute (INPE) opposed the investment in the VLS and favored less expensive foreign launches. In addition, the Chief of the VLS development, Jayme Boscov, claims that the program was harmed by a US-led technology boycott (the MTCR regime).54
With respect to satellite development, Brazil is most active in the area of space communications. In 1974, Brazil began leasing Intelsat transponders for domestic communications, the second country to do so. The first satellite in the Brasilsat system, SBTS (Sistema Vrasiliero de Telecommunicacoes por Satellite) was launched by Ariane in February 1985 and the second satellite was launched in March 1986. This series of satellites and ground stations was built by Spar Aerospace of Canada and Hughes Aircraft Co. for Embratel, the state-owned telecommunications company.55 These created the basis for developing educational, agricultural and medical TV programming nationwide. Over the years, Brazilian firms have produced the ground stations for this system, and the second generation of Brasilsat is manufactured by Embratel.56 Brasilsat 1 was launched by Ariane on February 8, 1985, and Brasilsat 2 on March 28, 1986. Nine years later, on March 28, 1995, Brasilsat B2, built by EMBRATEL, was successfully orbited by Arianespace.
The Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciales is active in the design and manufacture of additional satellites. The SCD-1 (Satelite de Coleta de Dados) is a small 115kg. satellite designed to provide weather and climate data, and is used to monitor degradation of the Amazon rain forest. It was placed into orbit in 1993 by an American air-launched Pegasus booster. The INPE is also reportedly in the process of developing three additional satellites in this series to collect environmental data and remote sensing data.57
The Brazilian space agency has also discussed cooperation with other states, including China58 and Russia. In July 1988, Brazil and China signed an agreement (CBERS- China Brazil Earth imaging satellites) for the development of two earth imaging satellites. According to Alves, "The CBERS is aimed at the development of a complete remote sensing system by developing countries which would be both compatible to and competitive with other systems produced and operational during the present decade"59. The first satellite was originally to have been launched in 1993, with a replacement going up in 1995. The status of this project is unknown at this time. In March 1995, a Russian delegation visited Brazil and discussed specific cooperation programs and objectives.60
D. Indonesia
Due to its island geography, Indonesia has sought to develop an extensive satellite communications system, and was the first developing state to operate its own communications satellite (PALAPA A, 1976). The PALAPA B series (with 24 transponders per satellite), manufactured in the United States, and launched by a US launcher, began operation in 1983. The latest satellite, PALAPA B4, was launched in May 1992, and provides communications links for Indonesia, N.Guinea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. In the longer term, Indonesia has broader ambitions of becoming a major Asia-Pacific power in the area of technology, including space technology. However, independent launch and satellite development capabilities seem to be many years away.
E. South Africa
Prior to the regime change and election of Nelson Mandella, South Africa had an ambitious space development plan. The indigenous ballistic missile development program provided the basis for the production of an independent satellite launch capability.
Most of the South African effort in the 1980s and early 1990s was concentrated on the development of imaging satellites. Denel Aerospace has designed Greensat, which was initially planned as a military intelligence platform, but following the change in government, became a commercial venture, with an emphasis on environmental monitoring and land management.
As Gupta and other analysts have noted, this platform is clearly a dual use system capable of providing high-resolution military intelligence. According to published reports, the Greensat is to have a 1.8 meter GSD high resolution camera. Current plans call for the launch of GS-01 in late 1995, and a system of 3 satellites ("Greensense") is planned for late 1997 or 1998. (Prospective customers will negotiate for privileged use over certain regions.) The Greensense system will include a SAR (synthetic aperture radar) with the ability to provide images at night through cloud cover or other atmospheric disturbances. According to Gupta, this SAR system will be able to "resolve small structures that act as good electrical conductors or corner reflectors such as vehicles, aircraft, and buildings."61
However, in the wake of the changes in government in South Africa, and the broader political changes in the region, the future of this satellite and system is in doubt. The Mandella government has cut military and defense-oriented spending significantly, and government subsidies for Greensat are likely to be halted. The viability of a purely commercial imaging satellite, operated from South Africa, is questionable.
F. South Korea
South Korea currently operates a small space research program, but like other states, is interested in developing communications and imaging satellites. KITSAT-A is a 50kg. platform that includes a small communications relay and two charge coupled device imagers. It was built by the South Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, in collaboration with the University of Surrey (which designed the platform), and launched by an ESA Ariane launcher in 1992.62
KITSAT-B was placed into polar orbit in September 1993 aboard an Ariane launcher. It is based on the same platform as the KITSAT-1 satellite, and its payload includes an earth imaging and communications systems.63 As South Korea develops its indigenous military technology capability further, it is likely to also expand its space related activities. In the next decade, South Korea can also be expected to develop a local space launch system.
G. Pakistan
The Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), along with the Space Research Council (SRC) are responsible for this nation's space activities and development plans. In the past five years, SUPARCO has overseen the production and testing of sounding rockets, with an average of 3 or 4 launches per year and carrying high altitude and ionosphere research payloads. The 2-stage Shahpar launcher has a payload of 55 kilograms and reaches an altitude of 450 kilometers.64 In 1986, Pakistan contracted for the purchase of missile technology and a launch facility with an American firm (ISC Technologies), at a reported cost of $200-$300m. According to press reports, after 10% of the obligations were paid, Pakistan began to doubt if ISC could provide the assistance that had been anticipated, and apparently no useful technologies were transferred.65
SUPARCO is also active in sponsoring satellite development. The BADR-1 experimental digital communications satellite was launched by a Chinese Long March 2E in July 1990. It weighed 52 kilogram and had an orbital lifetime of 6 months. As in the case of Korea, the design for this micro-satellite was apparently based on the University of Surrey platform.66
As in the case of India and other states, Pakistan is also seeking to develop and operate remote sensing spacecraft. Officially, Pakistan claims to seek this capability in order to obtain data for precise mapping, flood control, pollution, and the location and development of mineral deposits and other natural resources. Despite a small budget ($7.5 million annually), Pakistan developed the BADR-B satellite, which employs a gravity gradient stabilization system, and carries a charge coupled device camera to test image transmission.67
II. Implications of Dual-Use Satellites For Regional Stability
As noted, many space-based and satellite systems are inherently dual-use technologies, with both civilian and military applications. Civil communications satellites can also be applied to military communications, and the information provided by navigation and meteorological satellites can be used by the military for planning maneuvers.68
Remote-imaging, earth observation and surveillance satellites are potentially the most important of these dual-use space systems. Dedicated reconnaissance systems had a major impact on the US-Soviet balance and played an important role throughout the Cold War. They can be used for defensive purposes, to provide early warning and information regarding attacks, as well as offensively through target location and related information. The US used satellite imaging intensively for monitoring events and deployments in the Soviet Union, as well as in regional conflicts. In the 1991 Gulf War, the use of space-based communications and reconnaissance systems were of prime importance to the US-led military effort.69 Similarly, the Soviet Union and, later, China70, developed extensive military reconnaissance capabilities and France is the process of deploying a similar system (Helios).
The intelligence provided by such satellites can be used both as a stabilizing and destabilizing factor. If intelligence strengthens early warning and crisis prevention or resolution, as well as anti-terrorist operations, it has a stabilizing effect. However, if used by an aggressor for target location, damage assessment in the context of attacks, or determination of order of battle, it can be very destabilizing .
The military potential of such satellites also depends on optical resolution, spectrum, orbital features, sun-angle, return time, etc. Of these, resolution is the major factor. In a broad sense, and for military reconnaissance purposes, satellite imaging capabilities can be divided into three categories, according to resolution.
-1)High resolution systems (four meters or less);
-2)Mid-level resolution (ten meters to four meters)
-3)Low-resolution (30 meters to ten meters)71
In general, systems with a GSD of four meters or less are defined as high-resolution imagers and have the greatest utility for intelligence purposes, although the area covered is also minimized.72 Characteristics of weapons systems, damage assessment, and even order of battle, require a resolution of 1 meter or less.73 In this category, the US and Russian military reconnaissance systems have the only currently available systems. The capabilities of the "emerging space competent states", like the commercial systems currently in operation, have significantly less sensitive optics.
Systems with resolutions of from 5 to 10 meters can also provide useful information. The SPOT system is the primary operational example in this category, and constituted the first dual-use imaging satellite.74 (As Krepon notes, while SPOT officials claim that the first-generation satellite "is not suitable for tactical purposes", their marketing efforts "clearly suggest some military applications".75) The first SPOT was launched in 1986, and included a panchromatic imager with a ground resolution of 10 meters, and a multispectral camera with 20 meter resolution. The latest in the series, SPOT 3, was launched in September 1993.
Images obtained from SPOT have been used for many national security-related purposes. For example, SPOT images were used to pressure the German government to end German industrial involvement in the construction of a chemical warfare plant in Rabta, Libya,76 and provided images of the CSS2 missiles Saudi Arabia purchased from China.77 There are indications that Iraq and Iran used SPOT images during their eight-year war.78 SPOT has also been used to obtain information regarding the Dimona nuclear reactor complex in Israel, sites in Iran and Iraq, and in the areas of Serbia and Bosnia.79 In a study involving the use of SPOT for observing military deployments in the Golan Heights, Jasani was able to identify anti-aircraft positions, barracks, perimeter fence locations, aircraft shelters, and other objects.80 SPOT also played an important role in revealing details of the situation at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor complex, and the distribution of these images demonstrated that inaccuracy of the official Soviet statements.81 (SPOT and LANDSAT images were embargoed during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, indicating that these images contained militarily useful information.82)
The Russian Soyuzkarta sells images from the Cosmos KFA-1000 and MK-4 and MFK-6 cameras, with resolutions of approximately 5 meters.83 (Russia also operates the KVR-1000 system, which has the potential of providing images 2 meters or less, but as Gupta notes, this system is also in use by the Russian intelligence community, many of the operating characteristics are unknown, and orders images take several weeks or months before they are filled). In 1978, the US government approved the licensing of commercial LANDSAT systems up to 10 meters resolution, but as of 1995, no such satellites had been built.84 (In 1998, this limit was removed as well.)
The military utility of systems with resolutions of between 30 meters and 15 meters is limited. This category includes LANDSAT (30 meters resolution), the European ERS (SAR 30m resolution), the Japanese JERS-1 (SAR-18m resolution) and the Russian ALMAZ, which uses synthetic aperture radar with a resolution of 15 meters. In addition, the ALMAZ 1, launched in 1991, carries an infrared radiometer with a resolution of 30m.85
Images at these resolutions are useful for detection of large area targets, such as space launching facilities, railroad yards, and coastal features. In 1985, Japanese defense analysts used LANDSAT images to identify improvements to a Soviet air based and to conclude that these improvements would allow the TU-22M Backfire bomber to be flown from this site.86 In addition, Norwegian academics sought to use LANDSAT images, with resolutions of 80 and 30 meters, to detect evidence of the Soviet naval build-up on the Kola Peninsula, with some apparent success.87 (LANDSAT images were also used to identify the oil wells that were ignited by Iraqi forces during their retreat from Kuwait in February 1991.88)
Thus, high-resolution satellite imaging systems with significant military impact still limited to the dedicated satellites of the primary space powers. However, the expected addition of a number of commercial high-resolution satellite imaging systems is likely to change this situation. Wider availability of satellite reconnaissance and space-based imaging, and increased resolution of commercial systems will increase their military impact. Satellite imaging is likely to contribute to instability in a number of regions.
High-resolution commercial imaging satellites, with resolutions under 5 meters, are currently being developed in the US, France, Russia, and Japan, as well as in Israel, and South Africa (as noted above).89 As Gupta notes, "States and political groups that do not have the advanced space systems for acquiring 'spy' satellite imagery will soon have the chance to buy the technological capability they lack."90
For example in 1992, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) submitted an application to purchase an imaging satellite from Litton/Itek. The Israeli government objected, arguing that after denying Israel assistance in obtaining reconnaissance technology, the US seemed to be prepared to supply the Arab countries with binoculars that will "enable them to see every military movement here."91 This was inconsistent with American pledges to guarantee the security of Israel and insure its technological superiority in order to offset the massive Arab quantitative advantage in weapons.92 Although the application was blocked by the US State department, it was endorsed by the space industry and its supporters in the US government.93
More recently, the proposed EYEGLASS project has aroused a great deal of controversy and debate. The EYEGLASS consortium was established in 1994, after the US government reviewed its policy and approved the sale of high-resolution satellite services. The satellite, which is scheduled for launching in 1997, will have a resolution of 1 meter, with potential coverage extending to an area of 14,400 kilometers.94
In late 1994, a Saudi company known as EIRAD acquired a major interest in the EYEGLASS venture, in return for exclusive rights to coverage in the Middle East. In response, the Israeli government expressed concern that this would give the Arabs, including Iraq, access to highly accurate intelligence information and threaten Israeli security and vital interests. In March 1995, the US government decided to study the matter in greater detail and to freeze the project during that period.95 In addition, Litton/Itek, one of American partners in EYEGLASS (since renamed OrbView) dropped out of the consortium, and its future is in some doubt.
A number of additional commercial ventures are planning to offer high-resolution satellite imaging. Earthwatch Inc. has announced plans to orbit a 3 meter system in 1996.96 In 1993, the WorldView Imaging Corporation received a license from the US Department of Commerce for the development of 3 meter resolution commercial imaging satellites, and two are currently under construction.97 Lockheed is developing the Space Imaging Satellite, with a planned GSD of 1 meter, and Alos, being produced by Japan, will have a 2.5 meter resolution.
Implications and Conclusions
While a detailed investigation of the impact of dual-use and dedicated military space systems in emerging space competent states is beyond the scope of this paper, some broad implications can be discerned. In the first place, the major and second-tier space powers - the US, Russia, France/Europe, China, and Japan will continue to be the dominant technological forces in the development and operation of these technologies and capabilities. Indian and Israeli launchers will develop slowly and remain limited with respect to payload and altitude. Due to the high costs and restrictions on technology transfer, other states with objectives aimed at developing space launchers, such as Brazil and Pakistan, are likely to remain earthbound for many years.
However, as noted, this will not limit access to space resources or operational capabilities. The availability of numerous and growing commercial launch services and the competition between them has increased the ability of many states to develop and operate satellite systems for various purposes. This group includes Brazil, Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa. In the next few years, this list is likely to grow.
As demonstrated in this paper, the impact on international security of the dual-use and dedicated military efforts of this group of emerging space competent states is very limited and likely to remain so. To the degree that an "arms race" or a military competition in space can be said to exist,98 it continues to be based on the activities of the first- and second-tier states.
The greatest short term impact of dedicated military space systems and dual-use technologies is in the use of high-resolution dual-use imaging satellites. As De Santis has noted, "given the persistence of territorial disputes and ethnic and religious tensions, ... the use of commercial observation satellites in other parts of the world may be more likely to foster than lessen conflicts in the 3rd world."99 This characterization is particularly true in the Middle East and South Asia regions.
However, as has been demonstrated in this paper, the impact of emerging space-competent states is small compared to first-tier commercial systems such as EYEGLASS (OrbView), improved SPOT, etc. The high costs of producing even limited systems with a few low-power and short-lived satellites will limit the independent capabilities of India, Israel, Brazil, etc. Thus, the impact of the commercial imaging satellite systems on global regional stability over the next decade is likely to be far greater than the systems developed by "emerging space-competent states".
In the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a number of proposals have been presented to limit the military impact of dedicated and dual-use space systems, in general, and of imaging satellites in particular. Some of these proposals are based on "greater transparency and predictability", and other forms of CSBMs in space.100 With respect to imaging satellites, proposals have been presented to create an international regime governing the use of these systems and the distribution of images.101
Strategically, however, space-related military technology and activities are linked directly to other forms of military deployments, both conventional and non-conventional. There is no technical or political basis for separating space technology from other areas or environments for the purposes of arms control and international limitations. This has always been the case for the major space powers (the US and USSR), and is also valid for the emerging space competent states.
The author would like to thank Yehuda Aspler for assisting in the research and writing of this paper.
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W. Blitzer, "Pollard: Not a Bumbler, But Israel's Master Spy", Washington Post, Feb. 15, 1987.  Alex Doron and Ami Ettinger, "Light Weight Satellite Orbits Earth Every 90 Minutes", Maariv, April 6, 1995.  Steve Rodan, "Space Wars", Jerusalem Post Magazine, March 10, 1995.  R. Woodward, "CIA Sought 3rd Country Contra Aid" , Washington Post, May 19, 1984.  R. Woodward, "Probes of Iran Deals Extend to Roles of CIA Director", Washington Post, Nov. 28, 1986.  "Arab States/Israeli Satellite", UPI, Sept. 21, 1988 reprinted in Current News, Sept. 22, 1988, p.3.  Ha'aretz, Feb. 5 1993, Nov. 10, 1993, "Riding on a Russian Satellite" Jan. 12, 1994.  Sharone Parnes, "Israeli Officials Decline to Discuss Role of Latest Ofeq", Space News April 10-16, 1995.  Sharone Parnes, "Israelis Regroup after loss of Satellite on Russian Launcher", Space News, April 3-9, 1995,  p.38.   Books, Journals:   Pericles Gasparini Alves, "Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security",  (New-York: United Nations, 1992).  Pericles Gasparini Alves, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: A Guide to the Discussions in the  Conference on Disarmament", (New-York: United Nations, 1991).  Aviation Week & Space Technology, (July 27, 1992; Aug. 10, 1992; Feb. 21, 1994; Sept. 26, 1994; Oct. 3,  1994; Oct. 17, 1994; Oct. 24, 1994; Nov. 1994).  Susan B. Chodakewitz and Louis J. Levy, "Implications for Cross-Border Conflict", in Commercial  Observation Satellites and International Security, Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector,  Mary Umberger eds., (London: Macmillan Press, 1990).  Amit Gupta, "Fire in the Sky", Defense and Diplomacy, 8:44-7, October 1990.  Vipin Gupta, "METEOSAT Imagery and the Second Gulf War" in John H. 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Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics, June, 1993.  Michael Krepon, "The New Hierarchy in Space", in Commercial Observation Satellites and International  Security, Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds.,(London:  Macmillan Press, 1990).  Thomas G. Mahnken, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter", Orbis, Fall 1991. Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 563- 579.  Laurence Nardon, Satellite Detection, Verification Matters No. 7, Verification Technology Information  Centre, November 1994.  Martin Navias, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East, (London: Brassey's, 1993).  Y.S. Rajan, "Benefits from Space Technology", Space Policy, August 1988.  Jeffrey Richelson, "Implications for Nations Without Space- Based Intelligence-Collection Capabilities",  Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, in Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman,  Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds.,(London: Macmillan Press, 1990).  Hugh De Santis, "Commercial Observation Satellites, Alliance Relations, and the Developing World",  Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, in Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman,  Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds., (London: Macmillan Press, 1990).  John Simpson, Philip Acton, and Simon Crowe, "The Israeli Satellite launch", Space Policy, May 1989.  SIPRI Yearbook: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Annual Volumes  1987-1994.  Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift In Defense Policy?, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,  1994).  Leonard Spector, "The Not-so-Open Skies", in Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector,  Mary Umberger eds., Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, (London: Macmillan  Press, 1990).  Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation" in William C.  Potter, Harlan W. Jencks eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, (Oxford:  Westview Press, 1993).  Gerald Steinberg, "Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining", (New-York: Praeger, 1983).  Study on the Application of Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space, Report by the Secretary-General,  (New-York: United Nations, 1993).  K. Subrahmanyam, "A View from the Developing World", in Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard  S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds., Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, (London:  Macmillan Press, 1990).  Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development?", World Politics, Vol.  38, January 1986.   Mary Umberger, "Commercial Observation Satellite Capabilities", in Commercial Observation Satellites and  International Security, Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds.,  (London: Macmillan Press, 1990).  Peter D. Zimmerman, "Evidence of Spying", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1989, pp. 24-5.  Peter Zimmerman, "The Use of Civil remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-1991 Gulf War,", in  John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and  Environmental Agreements, (London: Vertic, 1992), pp. 230-240.  "Space Activities of the United States, Soviet Union and Other Launching Countries/Organizations: 1957- 1993", Congressional Research Service Report to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of  Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, (Washington: US Government Printing  Office, 1994).  Endonotes:  1 "Space Activities of the United States, Soviet Union and Other Launching Countries/Organizations: 1957- 1993", Congressional Research Service Report to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of  Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, (Washington: US Government Printing  Office, 1994). p.135  (Hereafter referred to as CRS).  2 Pericles Gaspaini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, (New- York: United Nations, 1992); Pericles Gasparini Alves, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: A Guide  to the Discussions in the Conference on Disarmament", (New-York: United Nations, 1991); Bhupendra Jasani  ed., Outer Space: A Source of Conflict or Co-operation?, (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1991); N.  Jasentuliyana, "Ensuring Equal Access to the Benefits of Space Technologies for all Countries", Space Policy,  February 1994.  3 CRS, p.93.  4 In general, the first tier consists of the two major space powers, the US and Russia, which are the only states  that are able to produce the full range of launchers and satellite systems.  The second tier of states includes  those with some, but not all of the capabilities for designing, operating, and launching satellites.  This group  includes China, France (and the ESA), and Japan.  The third tier consists of states with some independent  capabilities, including India and Israel, with considerable indigenous programs, and Brazil, Pakistan, South  Korea and other states with somewhat lesser local capabilities.  The problem of categorization is discussed by  Pericles Gaspaini Alves (Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security,(New- York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 9-10) and by Edmundo Fujita, in CSBMs and Outer Space Activities, edited  by Pericles Gasparini Alves, UNIDIR, forthcoming, pp. 77-8.  5 Satellite systems can also serve to support regional conflict resolution.  During the confrontation between  the US and Soviet Union, satellite monitoring provided the "National Technical Means" (NTM) for verifying  arms control agreements.  Similarly, such overhead reconnaissance and NTM could also monitor regional  limitation agreements, and can be useful in the context of confidence building measures. (See Gerald  Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining, (New-York: Praeger, 1983);  Bhupendra Jasani, "Commercial Observation Satellites and Verification", in Michael Krepon, Peter D.  Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds., Commercial Observation Satellites and International  Security, (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p.142).   6 Report: 1980-81, Dept. of Space, Government of India, p.8.  7 Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Detection or Drift in Defense Policy?, (New York: Oxford Univ.  Press, 1994), p.201.  8 Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development ?", World Politics, Vol.  38, January 1986, p.339.  9 Ibid. (Thomas).  10 Smith, p.201; Amit Gupta, "Fire in the Sky", Defense and Diplomacy, January 1995.  11 Ibid. (Smith).  12 Pericles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security,  p.26.  13 Thomas G. Mahnken, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter", Orbis, Fall 1991.  14 CRS, p.158.  15 CRS, p.158-9; Aviation Week and Space Technology (AW&ST) July 27, 1992; TRW Space Log, 1992,  p.11.    16 AW&ST Oct. 24, 1994.  17 CRS, p.158-9.  18 The resolution of a given imaging system is a function of a number of factors, and can vary according to  altitude, angle, weather conditions, sun-angle, contrast, etc.  In general, the use of this term is based on a  standard ground sample distance (GSD) covered by a single pixel.  See Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For  Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore  Laboratory, University of California, September 28, 1994, p.2.  19 AW&ST October 24, 94; TRW Space Log 1991, p.21.  20 AW&ST October 24,1994; Jeffrey Richelson, "Implications for Nations Without Space-Based  Intelligence-Collection Capabilities", in Michael Krepon et al., p. 68.  21 CRS, p.158.  22 Krepon, p.69.  23 CRS p.162; Ha'aretz (Israel) February 5, 1993.  24 Michael Krepon, "The New Hierarchy in Space", in Michael Krepon et al., p.27; Alves estimates the total at  $300m (1992 US$) for a "standard earth observation satellite" with a maximum resolution of ten meters.    25 Maariv April 6, 1995; The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1995, p.160; John Simpson,  Philip Acton, and Simon Crowe, "The Israeli Satellite launch", Space Policy, May 1989.  26 AW&ST, October 17, 1994.  27 Israel has agreed to accept the MTCR guidelines, but is not a formal member of the MTCR.  28 AW&ST Oct. 17, 1994.  29 Ha'aretz August 15, 1994.  30 Jeffrey Richelson, in Krepon, et al., p.67, citing  B. Woodward, "CIA Sought 3rd Country Contra Aid",  Washington Post, May 19, 1984; Woodward, "Probes of Iran Deals Extend to Roles of CIA Director",  Washington Post, November 28, 1986.  31 Jane's Defense Weekly, October 1, 1988 (cited by Richelson in Krepon, et al, p.67).  32 John Kifner, "Israel Launches Space Program and a Satellite", New York Times, September 20, 1988,  (cited by Mary Umberger, "Commercial Observation Satellite Capabilities", in Krepon et al., p.13).  33 Michael Rotem, Jerusalem Post, "Spy satellite for Arab Emirates 'serious threat'", November 19, 1992, p.1.  34 Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant.  35 CRS, p.161; Additional thrust is needed to achieve the extra 1200 mph of velocity needed to escape into  orbit from a westward launch, this restricted the size of the payload to 156kg. (John Simpson et al., Space  Policy, May 1989).  36 CRS, p.161.  37 AW&ST October 17, 1994.  38 IAI Press Release, "OFEQ-3" Technical Data, April 4, 1995.  39 Sharone Parnes, "Israeli Officials Decline to Discuss Role of Latest Ofeq", Space News, April 10-16,  1995.  40 Ibid.  41 Ha'aretz, Nov. 10 1993.  42 Ha'aretz, April 13, 1995, citing Foreign Report.  43 Sharone Parnes, "Israeli Officials Decline to Discuss Role of Latest Ofeq".  44 Steve Rodan, "Space Wars", Jerusalem Post Magazine, March 10, 1995. US officials reportedly agreed to  link image distribution policies to the limitation adopted by the US government for US licensed images;  Ha'aretz, May 7, 1995.  45 AW&ST October 17, 1994.  46 AW&ST February 21, 1994; AW&ST October 17, 1994.  47 CRS, p.162.  48 The START treaty required the decommissioning of Russian SS-25 missiles, and these are being  transformed into commercial space launch vehicles called Start-1 (CRS p.5).  49 CRS, p.162.  50 Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, p.13.  51 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World", International Security, Winter 84/85,    p.183.  52 The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1995, p.159.  53 Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, p.14.  54 IPRI 1990 Yearbook, Ch. 9, Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", p.377.  55 asani, "Review of National Programmes", in Bhupendra Jasani ed., Outer Space: A Source of Conflict or  Co- operation?, (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1991), p.97.  56 Ibid.  57 TRW Space Log, 1993, pp. 3-4.  58 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.22.  59 Pericles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security.  p.16.  60 Andrei Kurguzov, 3/4 TASS 29: APRIL 3 1994 ITAR-TASS.  61 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, p.12.  62 TRW Space Log, 1992, p.17.  63 TRW Space Log, 1993, p.19.  64 AW&ST Aug. 10, 1992.  65 SIPRI 1991 Yearbook, Ch. 9, Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", p.331.  66 Ibid.  67 AW&ST Aug. 10, 1992.  68 See Civil Space Systems: Implications for National Security, Stephen E. Doyle, editor, UNIDIR  (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994), pp. 81-107.  69 Peter Zimmerman, "The Use of Civil remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-1991 Gulf War",  in John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and  Environmental Agreements (London: Vertic, 1992), pp. 230-240; see all remarks by Jeffrey Harris, director of  the United States National Reconnaissance Office, at the Space Foundation's 11th Annual Space Symposium,  Boulder, Colorado April 6 1995.  70 Through 1993, China had 33 successful launches, orbiting 36 satellites.  Most missions were not  announced and some were recovered on Earth after a few days, suggesting that they returned film images  presumably for military reconnaissance purposes (CRS p.137).  71 For weather information and other large-area features, such as smoke from bombing campaigns, or for  tracking large troop movements in the desert, even lower-resolution imaging systems have some military  utility.  See Vipin Gupta, "METEOSAT Imagery and the Second Gulf War" in John H. Poole and Richard  Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and Environmental Agreements, pp. 219- 229.  72 For a detailed analysis of the intelligence implications of different resolutions and other technical  characteristics, see Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead.  73 Umberger in Krepon, p.10.  74 Other civil space systems, including both US and Soviet manned space flights, produced images that may  have been applied to military purposes.  However, these were generally not systematic and were not available  for purchase, as in the case of SPOT or LANDSAT.  75 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.22.  76 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.21.  77 Richelson in Krepon et al., p.55.  78 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.23.  79 Peter D. Zimmerman, "Evidence of Spying", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1989, pp. 24-5.  80 B. Jasani, "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery", Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993.  81 See Krepon in Krepon et al., p.20.  82 Peter Zimmerman, "The Use of Civil remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-1991 Gulf  War,", in John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and  Environmental Agreements, pp. 230-240.  83 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead,  p.3.  84 Ibid., p.4.  85 TRW Space Log, 1991, p.5.  86 See Richelson in Krepon, p.55.  87 Peter Zimmerman, "Remote Sensing Satellites, Superpower Relations, and Public Diplomacy", in Michael  Krepon et al., p.35.  88 Peter Zimmerman, in John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of  Arms Control and Environmental Agreements, pp. 230-240.  89 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead.  90 Ibid., p.2.  91 AWST June 21, p. 80; Ha'aretz, February 5, 1993; Michael Rotem, "Spy satellite for Arab Emirates 'serious  threat', Jerusalem Post, November 19 1992, p.1.  92 See Dore Gold, US Policy Towards Israel's Qualitative Edge, (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 1992).  93 AWST June 21, p. 80; Ha'aretz, February 5, 1993; Michael Rotem, "Spy satellite for Arab Emirates 'serious  threat', Jerusalem Post, November 19 1992, p.1.  94 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, pp. 14-16.  95 Steve Rodan, "Space Wars".  96 Sharone Parnes, "Israelis Regroup after loss of Satellite on Russian Launcher", Space News, April 3-9,  1995, p.38.  97 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, p.4, 13-14.  98 Study on the Application of Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space, p.78.  99 Hugh De Santis, "Commercial Observation Satellites, Alliance Relations, and the Developing World", in  Michael Krepon et al., p.83.  100 See Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, Chapter II.  101 See Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead.